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Introduction
In this paper I would like to explore the relation between goodness (to agathon) and beauty (to kalon) in Plato. In the first place it will be argued that the evidence suggests that at the very least Plato believed there was a biconditional relation between goodness and beauty. That is, everything that is beautiful is good and everything that is good is beautiful. However, the evidence concerning the relation between beauty and goodness almost always has to do with concrete particulars, as opposed to Forms. In other words, it is almost always the case that where Plato speaks about the relation between beauty and goodness he is speaking about concrete particulars, whether these be persons, actions, or other objects of the sensible world. Very little, if anything, is explicitly said about the relation between beauty and goodness in the intellectual realm, the realm of the Forms. There are only a few passages where Plato could be taken to be speaking about beauty and goodness in the intellectual realm, and even in these few passages it has to be argued that he is in fact referring to the Forms. Thus when I say that beauty and goodness are biconditionally related in Plato, this has to be taken as referring to the sensible realm of concrete In the final analysis, I will argue that the evidence suggests that there are two Forms, and that the Form of the Good is distinct from the Form of the Beautiful. However, it seems that this was not at all a major concern of Plato and that he was much more concerned to show the closeness, if not virtual identity, between beauty and goodness, than he was 
The Translation of Kalos
Before beginning this investigation however, a word must be said about the vexed question of the correct translation of the Greek word kalos. Kalos is 
